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A SNAPSHOT OF AN INDUSTRY: THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR 






The development of biotechnology and pharmaceutical-based remedies has 
historically received careful legislative and judicial supervision since the early 
nineteenth century.1 The traditional application of patent law to this important sector 
sought to strike a delicate balance between the needs of a burgeoning industry and the 
important legal bounds of fundamental protection afforded to the holder of a patent.2 
Throughout the maturation of America’s patent law system, this often-oscillating 
balance underwent a series of seemingly perpetual tweaks, shifts, and re-definitions.3 
In 1984, Congress, in response to a Federal Circuit decision that essentially established 
a de facto extension of the patent term on a patent held by a brand-name drug *142 
                                                             
* The author is an associate in the New York office of Kenyon & Kenyon LLP. He earned his J.D. in 
2008 from the George Washington University Law School. The author would like to thank Professor 
Donald Dunner, who provided valuable guidance during the topic selection phase of the note writing 
process. The author would also like to thank his parents, Dr. Ian and Susanne Rothwell, for their support. 
1 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (holding that the 
manufacture of a patented machine for profit is a breach of a patent right). 
2 Justice Story remarked, in dictum, that “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to 
punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for experiments, or for the purpose of 
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.” Id. Story’s dictum 
effectively established the common law “research use defense” doctrine by which a patent infringer 
could assert that a patent-protected invention was being utilized for purely research related-purposes and 
thus avoid liability entirely. Id. 
3 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Merck II), 545 U.S. 193, 206-07 (2005) (holding that 
drugs not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission are covered by § 271(e)(1)); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990) (holding that research related to the production of medical 
devices fell under the 271(e) (1) exception); Madey v. Duke Univ. (Madey II), 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (holding that issues of fact existed as to the applicability of the experimental use exception); 
AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that § 271(e)(1) is 
applicable to Class II Medical devices); Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the data generated by the use of patented drugs can permissibly be used for 
business purposes); Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding 
generic drug producers could not begin FDA testing until the patent held by the principal had expired). 
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manufacturer,4 enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to create an explicit and unmistakable 
safe harbor by which research activities reasonably related to the FDA approval 
process would be immune to charges of patent infringement.5 Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1) grants, “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell 
within the United States or import into the United States any patented invention . . . 
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary 
biological products” (emphasis added). As with most legislative enactments devised to 
correct judiciary misgivings, substantial ambiguities exist within the terms of the 
corrective measure; the broad statutory language leaves ample room for debate and it 
remains unclear, even in the wake of extensive litigation before the nation’s highest 
courts, how far the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) truly extends.6 
Given the lack of directional clarity built into the relatively short § 271(e)(1) 
amendment, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have been left with considerable maneuvering room to mold the metes 
and bounds of the safe harbor provision around the presumptive legislative intent. 
There has undoubtedly been an expansion of the safe harbor guaranteed to drug 
developers by § 271(e)(1) at both the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court levels.7 
Despite the judicially-driven expansion of the safe harbor provision, ambiguities 
                                                             
4 Roche, 733 F.2d at 863-64 (holding that a manufacturer of generic drugs could not begin its FDA 
testing until the patent for the brand name drug had expired--which essentially resulted in an extension of 
the patent term for the brand name manufacturer as the producer of generic medications could not begin 
its research and testing phase, which often takes years, until the original patent itself had expired). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)\ 
6 See Merck II, 545 U.S. at 205 (exemplifying the vague nature of the amendment) (“We ... do not 
express a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of 
‘research tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.”). 
7 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 674 (expanding coverage to medical devices); Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1525; 
AbTox, 122 F.3d at 1029; Merck II, 545 U.S. at 206-07. 
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pertaining to the scope of the coverage persist. 8  It remains unclear how far an 
otherwise would- *143 be-infringer utilizing patented technology can extend a safe 
harbor defense into the research and development process and still remain liability 
free.9 In light of the relatively consistent expansion of the safe harbor provision, there 
is a general presumption that the protections afforded to the FDA research-based 
infringer will only become larger. Owners of highly specific biotechnology products 
can now warily look forward to the potential foreclosure of their protective patents, should the 
courts effectuate a further exception to infringement that would encompass the entire research and 
development process. This result, while initially lowering drug-development costs for universities and 
pharmaceutical companies by enabling virtually cost-free access to patented technologies, is ultimately 
undesirable as it will inevitably stifle an important segment of the American Biotechnology sector: that 
of research tool developers. 
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, large-scale developers of market-capturing drugs have only 
been able to maintain successful development of viable products through a steady reliance upon a readily 
available supply of research tools.10 Without expeditious access to such tools of the trade, it is difficult 
to surmise how a drug developer, without redirecting large allocations of capital for in-house 
development of such tools, would expect to maintain the same rate of innovation experienced under 
previous patent paradigms. This note will argue that, although a further expansion of the § 271(e)(1) 
provision to incorporate research tools into the envelope of protection afforded by the safe harbor will 
make certain research-orientated technologies more accessible to researchers in the immediate short 
term, it will have the eventual negative *144 consequence of stifling the development of the exact 
                                                             
8 See Merck II, 545 U.S. at 205 (not addressing whether or not research tools are covered by § 271(e)(1)). 
9 Id. 
10 See Henry G. Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
Industries, 2002 FED. RES. BANK DALLAS CONF. ON SCI. & CENTS: EXPLORING ECON. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 87, 90, available at http:// www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/science/grabowski.pdf (“The 
mapping of the genome, and related advances in fields like proteomics and bioinformatics, has led to an abundance 
of new disease targets. Nevertheless, some industry analysts have hypothesized that these developments may 
actually cause R&D costs to rise in the short run. The basic reason is that these new technologies require substantial 
up-front investments, and to date they have generated many disease targets that are not yet well understood. 
Eventually this expansion in the scientific knowledge base should lead to substantial efficiencies in the R&D 
process for new pharmaceuticals.”). 
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technologies that drug producers depend upon. If the courts carelessly expand the bounds of access to 
infringers too broadly, they will encourage the precise type of free-for-all rush on otherwise protected 
technologies that patent law was devised to prevent.11 This will result in the unfortunate and inefficient 
outcome of independent research tool developers being pushed from the market. In order to fully 
develop this argument, a comprehensive analysis is necessary of not only the law that has set the stage 
for this development, but also of the economic forces that both shape and drive the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries. With this analysis as the backdrop, the note will then demonstrate that any 
further broadening of § 271(e)(1) to include research tools will effectuate not only a violation of the 
legislative intent that clearly drove the formulation of § 271(e)(1), but also some of the more 
fundamental precepts of patent law that a high tech industry must invariably rely upon. 
 
I. The Creation and Expansion of § 271(e)(1) 
A. The History 
The presumptive goal of patent law is to strike a harmonious balance between the needs of an inventor 
and the public’s right to access. The general theory is that an inventor, without an obtainable level of 
enforceable, meaningful protection for the financial value of the invention, will be disinclined to both 
disclose the invention to the public and continue further inventive activities.12 Continued innovation, of 
course, is the mainstay by which a progressive society improves the lot of its citizenry. As such, the 
courts have thus been apt to both recognize and *145 enforce a patent, in light of potentially infringing 
activities, for the duration of its term once the foundational requirements of the United States Patent and 
Trademark office have been met.13 
 
However, the application of rigorous, primary inventor-friendly jurisprudence in the realm of 
                                                             
11 See e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he State’s interest is closely 
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavors.”). 
12 See U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-376 (LexisNexis 2000). 
13 See generally In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the anti-tumor compound covered by the 
patent entailed sufficient utility to survive challenges by the PTO). 
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inventor-on-inventor type infringement quickly fell into a state of merged anonymity and desuetude.14 
This somewhat errant incantation of patent law found its inception in the words of Justice Story, who 
remarked, in dictum, that “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who 
constructed [a patented] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of 
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine.” 15  Utilizing this “research use defense” doctrine, a 
defendant in an infringement suit could assert that the patented invention was utilized for purposes 
related to research only, and thus potentially could avoid liability.16 This defense lingered in modest 
application, in conjunction with the safe harbor established by § 271(e)(1) for drug developers, until 
2002, when the Federal Circuit exacted a substantial limitation upon the doctrine in Madey v. Duke 
University (Madey II).17 
 
B. The Death of a Common Law Doctrine 
Until the Madey18 decision in 2002, a commercially-based developer of technologies could expect to 
find protection against infringement claims within the confines of the common law research use defense 
doctrine. The Federal Circuit, in carefully crafting its limitation to the lingering doctrine, declared in its 
Madey decision that only experimental uses relating to one of three exceptions, “[1] amusement ... [2] 
idle curiosity ... [and 3] strictly philosophical inquiry” *146 could now reasonably expect to find shelter 
in the much-narrowed confines of the now-anemic research use common law defense.19 On remand, the 
Federal Circuit ordered the district court to apply the new and significantly narrower application of the 
experimental use defense.20 The correct focus for the district court, as instructed by the Federal Circuit, 
                                                             
14 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
15 Id. 
16 See Madey v. Duke Univ. (Madey I)., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 307 
F.3d at 1362 (holding that statements made by university that it intended to use certain elements of its lab for 
commercial uses were insufficient to preclude the application of the research use defense). 
17 Madey II, 307 F.3d at 1362 (holding that the common law research use defense now only applied to only 
experimental uses relating to “amusement ... idle curiosity ... [and] strictly philosophical inquiry”). 
18 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
19 Id. at 1362. 
20 Id. 
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was not to be placed on the non-profit status of the defendant, but instead on the legitimate business use 
of the patented invention by the defendant and whether such use fell within the parameters of the three 
exemptions.21 With the common law defense thus limited, it no longer remains a viable defense for 
infringers except in the most restricted of circumstances.22 
 
C. The New Research Use Defense: § 271(e)(1) 
Interestingly, the virtual eradication of the common law defense doctrine only came after a prolonged § 
271-based judicial redefinition of the rights of patent holders.23 Though no substantive explanation was 
provided in the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey II for its limiting maneuver, one can only surmise 
that the court was concerned with leaving a loop hole (established by the expansion of § 271(e)(1) and 
the sufficiently vague language of the common law research-use defense) so broad that any infringing 
use relating, in at least some capacity, to a form of a research and development application would be able 
to find protection under the two prongs of potential exemption.24 It is also plausible, however, that the 
court removed the somewhat outdated common law ancestor with an eye towards a future, more 
contemporary rendition anchored in statutory language--thus ensuring researchers a more rigid and 
predictable *147 avenue of defense against infringement claims. It has been suggested that the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in its recent Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.25 decision, recreated a surrogate 
form of the experimental use defense, this time finding its legal foundation in § 271(e)(1).26 
 
D. The Application of Section 271(e)(1) 
Enacted by Congress in response to the Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.27 decision, 35 
                                                             
21 Id. The exceptions being: 1) amusement, 2) idle curiosity, and 3) strictly philosophical inquiry. 
22 Madey v. Duke Univ. (Madey III), 336 F. Supp. 2d 583, 591 (M.D.N.C. 2004). The restricted circumstances 
being the three applicable exceptions described in the Madey II decision. 
23 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Merck II), 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 
496 U.S. 661 (1990); AbTox, Inc., v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Telectronics Pacing Sys. 
v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
24 Madey II, 307 F.3d at 1362-63. The two prongs being: 1) either the common law doctrine after Madey II, or 2) 
the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. 
25 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
26 Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special 
Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 939 (2006). 
27 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a manufacturer of generic drugs could not begin its FDA testing until 
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U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), has proven to be a force for erosion of patent holders’ rights.28 The apparent end 
product, as indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court, is a shape-shifting brand of jurisprudence dedicated to 
the expansion of the safe harbor.29 This judicial mobility has found its spur in the ambiguous language of 
§ 271(e)(1), which reads in pertinent part, that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to ... use . . . a 
patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development ... of drugs or veterinary 
biological products.”30 This reasonably related “safe harbor” provision has been the impetus for much 
judicial activism. Even now, despite extensive litigation on the matter, it remains unclear how far this 
safe harbor actually extends.31 
 
*148 The ubiquitous trend is unmistakable.32 In its first interaction with the new statutory provision, the 
Supreme Court was quick to eradicate any apprehension that they would impute a restrictive 
interpretation on the vague statutory language of § 271(e)(1).33 Instead, the Court in Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia in 1990, went on the offensive and 
expressed no qualms about expeditiously expanding the scope of the safe harbor to medical devices, a 
biotechnology subset not expressly addressed by the statute.34 In the eyes of the Court, § 271(e)(1) was 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the patent for the brand name drug had expired). 
28 Id. at 863. Congress passed 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) in 1984 to respond to this decision as it essentially resulted in a 
de facto extension of a patent term for the brand name manufacturer, as the producer of generic medications could 
not begin its research and testing phase (which often takes years) until the original patent itself had expired. 
Congress declared that the statutory definition of patent infringement did not include any experimental activity 
“reasonably related” to submitting information to the FDA. H.R. Rep. No. 857, at 8. Drug manufacturers, under the 
auspices of this statute, were then able to begin the testing phases of their generic medications while the patent held 
by brand name producer was still valid. Given this “head start,” these producers were able to have their generics on 
the market shortly after the expiration of the patent held by the principal. 
29 See Merck II, 545 U.S. 193. 
30 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
31 Merck II, 545 U.S. at 205 (“We ... do not express a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts 
from infringement the use of ‘research tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.”). 
32 See Telectronics Pacing Sys. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the data 
generated by the use of patented drugs could be used for business purposes, i.e. the recruitment of potential 
investors, share-holders, etc.); accord AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp. 122 F.3d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(extending 
the scope of the Hatch-Waxman act to Class II devices, which, and unlike Class III devices, can be marketed without 
FDA approval). 
33 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990). 
34 Justice Scalia, for the Court, wrote that “the core of the present controversy is that petitioner interprets the 
statutory phrase, ‘a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,’ to refer only to those 
individual provisions of federal law that regulate drugs, whereas respondent interprets it to refer to the entirety of 
any Act (including, of course, the FDCA) at least some of whose provisions regulate drugs. If petitioner is correct, 
only such provisions ... governing premarket approval of new drugs, are covered by § 271(e)(1), and respondent’s 
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created with the legislative intention of applying the safe harbor provision to any Federal Act, as long as 
some portion of that act, no matter how de minimis, regulated or contributed to the drug approval 
process.35 Using this rationale, the Court in Eli Lilly.36 held that because the FDCA is implicated in the 
regulation of both medical devices and drugs, the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor is appropriately applied to 
medical devices.37 Such a broad application of the statute undoubtedly has had a substantial negative 
impact upon the value of certain patents.38 
 
*149 II. A War of Words: Merck v. Integra and Competing Ideologies 
A. Judge Rader and the Thoughts of an Expert Court39 
In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA (Merck I), the steady progression towards open-range 
access to patented biotechnologies encountered its first noticeable bump in the road in 2003 when the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, headed by Judge Rader, issued an unambiguous decree 
                                                                                                                                                                              
submission ... [regarding] medical devices, would not be a noninfringing use.” Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 666. At the very 
outset, Justice Scalia makes the expansive intentions of the Court clear: “the phrase ‘patented invention’ in § 
271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.” Id. 
35 Justice Scalia explains that “[t]he phrase ‘a Federal law’ can be used to refer to an isolated statutory section ... 
[t]he phrase is also used, however, to refer to an entire Act.” Id. Justice Scalia then backs this assertion with a 
contextual analysis of the statute, arguing that “[t]his latter usage, which is probably the more common one, seems 
also the more natural in the present context.” Id. at 667. 
36 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
37 Id. at 673. 
38 Petitioners, in an attempt to caution the Court about the travails of an over-expansive policy, argue “that there 
was good reason for Congress to establish an infringement exemption with respect to drugs but not devices, since 
testing of the latter does much greater economic harm to the patentee. Devices, petitioner contends, are much more 
expensive than drugs ($17,000 each for respondent’s allegedly infringing defibrillators); and many have only a 
small number of potential customers, who will purchase only a single device each, so that depleting the market 
through testing may do substantial harm. These concerns, however, apply with respect to certain drugs as well.” Id. 
The justification that “these concerns ... apply ... to certain drugs as well” is woefully ill-equipped to address the 
underlying reality sitting at the heart of the petitioner’s complaint. Id. It is insufficient to claim that because 
Congress intended the safe harbor to apply to certain high-cost, large-market drugs, the eradication of the 
profitability of an entire subset of the biotechnology sector is justified. Certainly the Congressional intent in 
establishing the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor was to encourage the advent of low-cost pharmaceuticals. Is this goal best 
served by the destruction of biotechnology micro-markets dependent upon drug-developing customers? The Court 
seems to impute little weight to this concern, an indication that it does not recognize the full economic ramifications 
of the matter. Id. 
39 United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Homepage, http://www/cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2008)(The Federal Circuit ... has nationwide jurisdiction in ... patents”). 
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effectively limiting the otherwise broad scope of § 271(e)(1).40 Such a limitation, as enacted and 
described by the Federal Circuit, was not anchored by an analysis of the context and potential meaning of 
statutory language, but instead was directly tied to a pragmatic evaluation of the legislative intent 
underlying the enactment of § 271(e)(1).41 More revealingly, Judge Rader quoted from the language of 
the House Committee Report, which explains that the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) was to only be applied 
to “a limited amount of testing so that generic manufactures can establish the bioequivalency of a generic 
substitute.”42 The *150 House Committee Report on § 271(e)(1) goes on, stating in clear language that 
intended consequences for patent holders after § 271(e)(1) were to be micro in scale, noting that “all that 
the generic can do is test the drug for purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval. Thus, the 
nature of the interference is de minimis.”43 
 
By comparison, in the Merck I case, the experimental processes before the court did not present the issue 
of direct drug information submission to the FDA.44 Instead, the case dealt with a pre-FDA submission 
stage and an experimental screening process by which patented compounds were used to screen for 
potential would-be drug candidates.45 The experimental use of patented compounds in pre-submission 
type experiments is not one of the stated legislative goals underlying § 271(e)(1). As such, this use was 
                                                             
40 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
41 Judge Rader, in describing the rationale behind the Congressional enactment of § 271(e)(1), states that § 
271(e)(1) had two purposes. “In the first place, the 1984 Act sought to restore patent term to pharmaceutical 
inventions to compensate for the often-length period of pre-market testing pending regulatory approval to sell a new 
drug. The second reason for the 1984 Act responded to ... Roche ... to ensure that a patentee’s rights did not de facto 
extend past the expiration of the patent term because a generic competitor also could not enter a market without 
regulator approval.” Id. at 865. The Federal Circuit, having addressed the issue previously, stated that “[s]ection 
271(e) permits premarket approval activity conducted for the sole purposes of sales after patent expiration.” 
Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 756, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
42 H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2692. This language lends itself directly 
to the two-pronged assertion made by Judge Rader that the intended purpose of § 271(e)(1) was, in its bare 
application, to prevent the de facto extension of the patent term held by the brand-name drug manufacturer. 
Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., 109 F.3d at 763. Certainly this Congressional “loop hole” has a valid purpose in that it 
encourages the production and sale of generic medications upon the exact moment of the expiration of the 
principal’s patent. Why Justice Scalia decided to overlook this unambiguous legislative language in his Eli Lilly 
opinion remains unclear. 496 U.S. at 667. 
43 H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8. Any result that then might enact some sort of greater-than-de minimus type effect on a 
particular subset of the biotechnology market would not be appropriate under the language of the report (as the use 
then falls outside the realm of the congressionally-intended consequences of § 271(e)(1)). 
44 Merck I, 331 F.3d at 863. 
45 Id. 
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not appropriately within the safe harbor. 
 
More specifically, the § 271(e)(1) exception was adopted in response to the Roche decision which 
resulted in a de facto extension for the principal’s patent term--a result that Congress felt required 
realignment.46 Congress created its safe harbor with the intention of guaranteeing immediate public 
access to generic medications upon expiration of a patent. 47  As the House Committee Report 
contemplated only a de minimis impact, it appears ambitious to construe a safe harbor that applies to any 
activity, as long as it retains some relation to drug *151 discovery.48 Such an approach places a heavy 
toll upon the holders of certain biotechnology patents as it essentially precludes access to a market, 
which, in some circumstances, constitutes the entirety of the consumer base. Certainly such an effect is 
not de minimis, and strikes a dissonant chord with the overall themes underlying the Congressional 
enactment of § 271(e)(1).49 
 
Section 271(e)(1) was enacted to allow de minimis access to patented technologies so that a 
manufacturer of generic drugs would be able to have its product ready for public access as early as 
legally permissible. It was not created with the intention of enabling a legal free-for-all on the now 
transparent rights of patent holders, as long as there remained some sort of potential connection to a 
mystery process that might, at some unknown date, produce a drug somewhere in the pipeline. Such a 
result, in its real world application, essentially revokes the full value of many biotechnology products, 
rendering the underlying patent more or less meaningless. 
 
B. A Contrasting Viewpoint: The Supreme Court Weighs In 
                                                             
46 H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8. 
47 Judge Rader correctly asserts that “[t]he meaning of the phrase ‘reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information’ as set forth in § 271(e)(1) is clear in the context of the role of the 1984 Act in facilitating 
expedited approval of a generic version of a drug” ... and that “[t]he FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that 
may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA approval.” Merck I, 331 F.3d at 866 (emphasis added). Judge 
Rader also restates, in clear terms, that “the express objective of the 1984 Act was to facilitate the immediate entry of 
safe, effective generic drugs into the marketplace.” Id. at 866-67. In light of the circumstances of Roche, and the 
language found in the House Committee Report, this seems to the only plausible conclusion. 
48 Merck I, 331 F.3d at 867 (holding that the patented peptides at issue were not sufficiently related to the 
production of a pharmaceutical compound and thus not covered under the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1)). 
49 H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Merck II),, in a unanimous 
decision written by Justice Scalia in 2005, issued an opinion effectively aimed at undoing the entirety of 
the Federal Circuit’s limitation on § 271(e)(1).50 Instead of assuming a cautionary role, the Court went 
on the offensive, declaring that safe harbor now applied to “all uses of patented inventions that are 
reasonably related to the ... submission of any information under the FDCA”--effectively extending the 
bounds of the safe harbor to their broadest possible application.51 The justification for such expansion is 
sparse.52 Curiously, and maybe somewhat *152 revealingly, Justice Scalia complains that “to construe § 
271(e)(1), as the Court of Appeals did ... is effectively to limit assurance of exemption to the activities 
necessary to seek approval of a generic drug ... [and] [t]he statutory text does not require such a result.”53 
Yet such a limitation, as previously discussed, is not only directly in line with the language found in the 
House Committee Report, but also correlates directly with the judicial circumstances that precipitated 
the formation of § 271(e)(1) in the first place.54 Instead of addressing the intent-based arguments given 
by the Federal Circuit for limiting § 271(e)(1), Justice Scalia ignores the majority of Judge Rader’s 
reasoning, while devoting the virtual entirety of his opinion to detailing, in express terms, the full extent 
to which an accused infringer may seek coverage in § 271(e)(1)’s newly expanded harbor.55 In an 
otherwise nebulous opinion, the Court does not once address the concerns of Congress, as evidenced by 
the House Committee Report, nor does it attempt to make its holding comport with the overriding 
                                                             
50 545 U.S. 193, 194 (2005). 
51 Id. at 202. This statement creates a safe harbor that engulfs the more limited version crafted by the Federal 
Circuit by several orders of magnitude. The justification that Justice Scalia provides for the creation of such an 
expansive boundary has its substance grounded in these few words: “[a]s an initial matter, we think it apparent from 
the statutory text that § 271(e)(1)’s exemption infringement extends to all uses ...” Id. The apparentness for the need 
of such a massive safe harbor provision is clear to Justice Scalia--but was it equally apparent to Congress when it 
created § 271(e)(1)? The House Committee Report and the responsive nature (to Roche) of the legislation clearly 
suggests otherwise. H.R. REP. NO. 857. 
52 Merck II, 545 U.S. at 201 (“[T]he statutory text makes clear that it provides a wide berth .... [W]e think it 
apparent .... There is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the exemption.”). These 
statements are perplexing and strain credulity. The language of the § 271(e)(1) statute hardly provides anything that 
even approaches the degree of certainty that Justice Scalia purportedly sees in its midst. Instead, the statute is 
ambiguous and leaves room for interpretation (hence the resulting litigation). In light of such ambiguity, analysis of 
the surrounding circumstances and the legislative intent is required. It is therefore interesting to note that Justice 
Scalia declined to mention both the House Committee Report and the circumstances that gave rise to Roche in his 
opinion. 
53 Id. at 206. 
54 See H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8; Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
55 Merck II, 545 U.S. at 206 (“As to the first proposition, it disregards ... reality.”). Justice Scalia went on declare 
that § 271(e)(1) does not require that the use of patented compounds produces results that are ultimately submitted to 
the FDA to qualify for protection. Id. Justice Scalia also crafted jury instructions to be used by the lower tribunals. 
Id. at 208. 
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considerations presented by the fact that the Congressional enactment of § 271(e)(1) was directly 
responsive to the ruling in Roche.56 Instead, Justice Scalia demands that the statute be interpreted on its 
face only. In matters so complex, such a superficial mode of interpretation results in the creation of legal 
constructs that are *153 completely disengaged from the real-world undercurrents that drove the 
formation of the statute in the first place. Not only have the fundamental tenants of patent law been 
violated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s course of action, but so has the clear Congressional intent laid bare 
by the House Committee Report. 
 
C. The Safe Harbor and Research Tools 
Substantial controversy and debate has been sparked by the language in the Merck II opinion regarding 
the application of the safe harbor to research tools. The Court declined to address the matter as it saw the 
study of a patented research tool to be sufficiently different from the actual use of the same research tool. 
In line with this reasoning, the matter was therefore not correctly presented before the Court.57 
Regardless of how delineated this distinction may or may not be, there is a general presumption amongst 
research tool developers that when the U.S. Supreme Court revisits the issue, given its already somewhat 
ambitious expansion of § 271(e)(1), research tools will soon too be engulfed by the safe harbor. No 
matter how altruistic the motives for such a potential action would undoubtedly be, the deleterious 
outcome is unmistakable: certain “research tools” producers will be forced from the market. 
 
D. The Amici Rally to Merck 
The Merck II decision drew the attention of many interested parties. The Respondents, who were arguing 
that the Federal Circuit’s more limited version of § 271(e)(1) was the correct application, garnered the 
support of numerous biotechnology producers. Amongst the amici for respondents are some of the 
largest names in the industry.58 The amici for *154 respondents, almost uniformly, expressed a concern 
                                                             
56 See id. at 206. 
57 Id. at 205. 
58 The following institutions submitted briefs of amicus curiae for respondents: Benitec Australia Ltd., Wisconsin 
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that a further judicial broadening of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor would effectively vitiate the economic 
value of the average biotechnology patent.59 The amici, like the Federal Circuit, also expressed a 
concern that any further expansion of § 271(e)(1) would work to counteract the overriding congressional 
intent driving the formation of the statute.60 These concerns, coupled with numerous others, *155 acted 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Alumni Research Foundation, The American Council on Education, Boston University, The Regents of the 
University of California, Research Corporation Technologies, The Salk Institute for Biological Studies, University 
of Alberta, University of Oklahoma, Applera Corporation, Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Vaccinex, Inc., Invitrogen 
Corporation, Analytical & Life Science Systems Association, Biocom, Affymetrix, Inc., Diversa Corporation, 
Quantum Dot Corporation, Sangamo Biosciences, Inc., and Symyx Technologies, Inc. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, 
Benitec Australia Ltd. in Support of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. and The Burnham Institute, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 
(No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682092; Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in Support of 
Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682088; Brief of Amici Curiae Applera Corporation 
and Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682090; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Vaccinex, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 
682091; Brief for Invitrogen Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 
(No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682093. 
59 See Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 
545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682088, at *16 (“[A] statutory construction that reads the word “solely” out 
of section 271(e)(1) would effectively neuter all research patents issued in the United States .... Such a construction 
would be inconsistent with the plain language of section 271(e)(1) ... and would violate the intent of Congress that 
any effect on the rights of patentees resulting from the enactment of section 271(e)(1) be de minimis.”); id. at *17 
(“In the event that the safe harbor of section 271(e)(1) is unduly expanded ... [there will be a] whittling away at the 
value of pharmaceutical research patents until nothing is left.”); id. at *18 (“[T]here [is] no use other than drug 
research for such [biotechnology] patents. Should the safe harbor of section 271(e)(1) be expanded to include 
general pharmaceutical research, it is inconceivable that such research patents will have any value left.”). Accord 
Brief for Invitrogen Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 
03-1237), 2005 WL 682093, at *3-4 (“If patents on such [research] tools can be readily infringed in the course of 
developing information for submission to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the economic value of the 
patents will be essentially lost and the incentives crucial to support creation of new and better tools in the future will 
be slowed, if not completely eliminated.”); id. at *4 (“[T]ool patents would lose essentially all economic value if 
their infringement is allowed during drug research and development.”); id. at *12-13 (“Without patent protection, 
capital markets would not invest in innovative small companies with ground-breaking new technology. Instead, the 
technology would either languish with limited capitalization from federal grants or would be developed and 
maintained within the confines of well-funded research organizations such as pharmaceutical companies that would 
have to protect their investment as a trade secret and limit its dissemination. By contrast, the patent system provides 
a means to encourage investment in innovative new and unproven technologies and, when those technologies prove 
successful, encourages their wide commercial availability and licensing as a means of recouping that investment.”). 
Accord Brief of Amici Curiae Applera Corporation and Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Merck 
II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682090, at *6 (“The potential cost of ignoring the term “solely” [in 
271(e)(1)] is staggering. The engine for modern drug discovery is the biotech industry. The biotech industry has 
provided an increasingly rich set of tools that are used for basic research, drug discovery, and drug development. 
Yet, if Section 271(e) is construed as the drug companies would like, the patents on such tools could be infringed 
cost-free. The patents protecting those innovations would lose their value and the incentive to create new tools 
would diminish dramatically.”). 
60 Brief of Amici Curiae Applera Corporation and Isis Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 
545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682090, at *5 (commentating on the purpose of § 271(e)(1)) (“Although the 
terms of the statute are not limited to immunizing infringement in the generic drug approval process, the exemption 
fits that circumstance like a glove. Because a generic drug is a copy of an existing product, there is no drug discovery 
necessary. What is necessary is to have a generic drug approved by the FDA by the time the patent on the proprietary 
version of the drug expires. This simply requires immunity from infringement for the development and submission 
of information to the FDA for regulatory approval to establish the generic copy is what it is supposed to be.”); Brief 
of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 193 
(No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682088, at *2 (commentating on the purpose of § 271(e)(1)) (“To expand the safe harbor of 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) beyond the limits set forth in the statute’s plain meaning and identified by the court of appeals 
below would have an adverse effect on the research community as a whole, and the university research community 
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as the impetus that helped form a virtual consensus amongst leading research institutions and 
commercial biotechnology producers that any further indelicate judicial manipulation of § 271(e)(1) 
could produce severe consequences for the industry.61 
 
Instead of addressing the real-world concerns voiced in the numerous amicus briefs, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, instead decided to rely holistically upon a surface level analysis of the basic language found in the 
statute itself, and very little more.62 The result is a hugely expanded safe harbor, with little deference 
given to the underlying industry--leaving many biotechnology patent holders with very little confidence 
that the high court would enforce their legal rights in the event of further litigation. 
 
III. A Snap Shot of an Industry 
The biotechnology sector is a robust industry that actively contributes to the stability of the American 
economy while simultaneously producing significant quality-of-life gains for the global population.63 
These gains, however, neither come cheaply nor quickly. On average, it takes $800 million dollars, over 
the course of a 10-12 year developmental period, to produce a *156 new biological compound.64 Despite 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in particular .... [As a result] there would be a lessened interest within the private sector to support university-related 
research functions.”); id. at *16 (arguing that the petitioner’s formulation of the statute is substantially overbroad, as 
virtually any use of a patented agent is, within some capacity, related to the process of FDA approval) (“[A]ny 
research activity relates, at least in some remote fashion, to the submission of information to the FDA for 
approval.”); Brief for Invitrogen Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Merck II, 545 U.S. 
193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682093, at *6 (commentating on the purpose of § 271(e)(1)) (“[The elimination of 
future tools] would substantially frustrate the purpose of Congress to ensure the continued development of new 
drugs for treatment of human disease. It also would undermine Congress’s intent to minimize the taking of the 
economic value of patents.”). 
61 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in Support of Respondents, Merck 
II, 545 U.S. 193 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 682088. 
62 See Merck II, 545 U.S. 193, 202-07. 
63 Biotechnology products target more than 200 diseases, including “various cancers, Alzheimer’s disease, heart 
disease, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, AIDS and arthritis.” BIO: Biotechnology Industry Organization, 
Biotechnology Industry Facts, http:// www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/statistics.asp. Furthermore, the biotechnology 
sector actively contributes to the advent of sophisticated medical diagnosis tests, cleaner industrial processes, better 
environmental maintenance and cleaning techniques, and enhanced food items. See id. 
64 S. Sivakumar, The Economics of Biotechnology, REDIFF, Sept. 8, 2003, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/sep/08guest2.htm. The culmination of all of this it to produce “lower overall 
medical costs, higher productivity, and increased longevity.” John v. Duca & Mine K. Yücel, Exploring the 
Economics of Biotechnology: An Overview, 2002 FED. RES. BANK DALLAS CONF. ON SCI. & CENTS: 
EXPLORING ECON. BIOTECHNOLOGY 3, 4, available at http:// 
www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/science/intro.pdf. The Biotechnology industry also has the potential to stimulate 
growth in other industries as well; “[Rice University President Malcolm] Gillis noted that the development of 
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these staggering costs and lengthy developmental periods, only 22% of the compounds that undergo 
clinical trials ever achieve FDA approval.65 
 
The biotechnology sector is large, and at the end of 2003, there were 1,473 biotechnology companies 
within the United States.66 Of those 1,473 companies, only 314 were publicly held.67 In 2003, the 
American biotech industry generated over $39 billion dollars in total revenue.68 In 1992, this revenue 
sum was only $8 billion dollars --a revenue increase of some $31 billion dollars in an eleven year time 
span.69 The expansion of the industry has been dramatic. The biotech industry is also an important 
destination for investors’ capital, and as of early 2005, the total value of publicly traded biotech 
companies equaled $311 billion dollars.70 The industry also provides employment for some 200,000 
Americans.71 It is clear that the biotechnology industry remains upwardly mobile at this early stage of its 
development. 
 
Given the large costs, lengthy periods, and low success rates associated with the development of 
biologics, biotechnology producers place tremendous importance upon the patentability of a potential 
technology. In fact, a survey of biotech firms reveals that the possibility for obtaining a patent on a 
particular item is one of the key considerations affecting *157 research and development decisions.72 It 
is clear that given the requisite investment for biotechnological development, ambiguities in patent 
protection (thus affecting potential obtainable revenue) will weigh heavily upon the direction of 
development in the biotechnology sector. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
biotech will help accelerate growth in dozens of other industries, thereby fostering overall economic growth. 
Biotech innovations are generally the outcome of the interplay of a collection of discoveries in different fields over 
a long period. In particular, Gillis stressed how biotech progress is propelled by a synthesis of new technologies, not 
only from the biosciences but also from other sciences, such as information technology and nanotechnology.” Id. 
65 Sivakumar, supra note 64. 






72 Duca & Yücel, supra note 64, at 6. 
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Much of what remains profitable in the biotech sector is not found in direct product development, but 
instead in the development of techniques and tools to be utilized in the research and development 
process.73 Traditionally, various forms of licensing agreements have maintained the financial incentive 
for further development of otherwise unmarketable compounds.74 Until recently, however, developers 
have not had reason to doubt the vitality of their patents, and the portion of the market devoted to the 
creation of biological compounds for use in research & development has remained profitable. In light of 
recent judicial adjustments however, the patentability of these items has been thrown into stark 
question.75 Leaders of the industry have made clear that market incentives must remain stable in order to 
justify the risk of pursuing further innovation. 
 
IV. Good Ideas, IPOs, and Venture Capital 
Venture capital plays an important role in buttressing the mainstay of America’s biotechnology 
corporations. Traditionally, biotech firms have sought to procure additional revenue by making an initial 
public offering (“IPO”). In more recent years, biotechs have seen a shift away from the reliance on initial 
public offerings for the creation of funds to the incorporation of wealthy venture capitalists.76 The 
private, independent investor is generally not *158 as bullish as the prototypical venture capitalist. 
Instead, investors are now demanding more than just useful ideas--they want products that are complete 
and immediately profitable. Research companies still in the R&D stage with only unproven ideas to sell 
generally obtain low selling prices from their IPOs.77 To generate the requisite financial resources to 
continue research, these smaller biotechnology companies with unproven intellectual property have 
developed a working relationship with risk-savvy venture capitalists. This enables companies with 
                                                             
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Merck II), 545 U.S. 193, 205 (2005). 
76 Peter Benesh, In Tight IPO Market, Cash-Needy Biotechs Weigh Their Options, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, 
Nov. 13, 2006, available at http:// www.investors.com/ibdarchives/artshow.asp?atn=248264645905504 (remarking 
that the number of IPOs in fell from 73 in 2000 to 7 in 2001 and 6 in 2002). 
77 Id. 
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unproven IP to procure substantial investment from outside sources while still being involved in the 
R&D phase of their product. Without access to investment funds from such venture capitalists, it is 
unclear whether an alternative source of investment would be obtainable in the modern market.78 
 
By all accounts, the biotechnology sector’s economic vital signs are strong. The industry tends to attract 
investors and venture capitalists alike during periods of more generalized economic downturn. This is 
largely due to the fact that investors tend to believe that the technology component of the business 
isolates it from the susceptibilities that plague the more generalized elements of the American 
economy.79 The fact that investors view certain life sciences technologies as essential in terms of their 
applicability to modern medicine, etc. leads some to believe that they have “little defensive posture” with 
regards to their investments.80 
 
The biotechnology industry itself is still relatively young. Many of the pioneering technologies are only 
now realizing their full potential. Innovation in this sector is robust, and the technological boundaries of 
the industry are still expanding. As a result, venture capitalists are lured to the industry by the prospect of 
large gains from the development of new and *159 profitable technologies.81 In a financial world where 
the bounds are new and relatively unknown, the stream of investment capital is not in short supply. Yet 
the profitability of whatever new technology that happens to hit the market next rests upon the strength 
of its patent. If patents are weakened, it is possible that the venture capitalists will go elsewhere82 
                                                             
78 See Id. (suggesting that traditional investors have become too skittish with regards to developing life science 
technologies and thus biotechs have developed a symbiotic reliance on the venture capitalists who seem more 
willing to gamble on the risks inherent to any new developing technology). 
79 Donald H. Gold, Biotech Gains Ground Amid Economic Fears, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 25, 2006, 
available at http:// www.investors.com/ibdarchives/artshow.asp?atn=246622620210615. 
80 Id. 
81 Peter Benesh, Health Industry Sees Green In Gray, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 3, 2006, available at 
http:// www.investors.com/ibdarchives/ArtShow.asp?atn=220961820440440 (“‘It’s a good time to be a venture 
capitalist seeking biotech inroads,’ says Nick Galakatos, managing director of newly formed Clarus Ventures. ‘It’s 
an exciting time to invest in this sector for a variety of scientific as well as market reasons,’ he said. With the human 
genome completed, ‘science is expanding our knowledge of the molecular basis for disease, and that gives us new 
mechanisms for targeting disease.”’). 
82 It is acknowledged that the economic forces that dictate the flow of venture capital to various markets are 
complex. One could point to any number of current economic predictors and declare that the biotechnology industry 
is currently as robust and as healthy as it has ever been. Though the economic signs generally show this to be true, 
the idea that a healthy industry such as America’s biotech can withstand any degree of judicial tampering without 
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V. Biologic Generics 
Traditionally, generics only existed within the realm of the pharmaceutical compound. Pharmaceuticals, 
with their defined and illustrated chemical structures and formulas, were readily amenable to 
reproduction by generic manufacturers once the patent term of the principal expired. Now, mainly due to 
advances in technology within the biotech sector, generics of biologics are beginning to make their way 
to market prior to the expiration of their patented counterparts.83 With the advent of these generics, there 
has been confusion at the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).84 The FDA is unsure how to classify 
competing generics, mainly *160 because biological drugs are composed of proteins, which, when 
placed in a complex biological system such as a human body, can have a broad range of effects. These 
results lie in contrast to those produced by the more predictable chemical compounds found in 
pharmaceuticals. As a result of the confusion created by the complexity inherent to biological drugs, the 
fate of generic biologics has been uncertain.85 
 
Senator Waxman, D-Calif., the co-author of the § 271(e)(1) provision that created the original safe 
harbor for pharmaceutical generics, recently took notice of the problem facing biologic generics. He 
expressed concern that the ambiguity surrounding the nature of biologics was hindering the development 
and production of reasonable generic substitutes.86 As a result, Waxman, operating in conjunction with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
experiencing some sort of significant consequence is fictitious. It is too early in the process to say whether or not 
Merck has already had a negative effect upon the industry--the court itself declared that it was not yet in a position to 
comment upon the applicability of § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor to research tools--and not much time has passed since 
the decision. Still, it almost goes without saying that the strength of the American patent as pioneered by Thomas 
Jefferson has been the mainstay from which the United States has derived its status as a chief innovator amongst the 
world’s powers. The significance of the patent system cannot be overlooked or underestimated, even in light of 
robust economic figures as presented by the biotechnology industry. Without secure and predictable patents, it is 
unclear that venture capitalists will continue to find “safe harbor” in the biotech industry. 
83 The term “biologics” is defined as “commercial products derived from biotechnology.” See Dictionary.com, 
Biologics Definition, http:// dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=Biologics. 
84 Peter Benesh, Generic Threat Puts Biologic Firms on the Defensive, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 16, 
2006, available at http:// www.investors.com/ibdarchives/ArtShow.asp?atn=245844266106805 (pointing out that 
the confusion arises due to the “FDA’s inability to determine whether a biological drug is identical in all respects to 
the original drug.”) (“‘Biological molecules are more complex (than chemical-based drugs),’ said Joseph Reisman, a 
biotech attorney ... ‘They can react differently with cells and receptors on cells. Their presence in the bloodstream 
can’t be tracked in any linear way to their efficacy.”’). 
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
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Senators Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer, introduced a bill to update the existing law so that the 
FDA would be permitted to approve generic biologics without being mired in the current state of 
ambiguity and confusion.87 In a recent statement, Waxman declared that, 
“[g]eneric versions of brand-name drugs have long been an essential way for patients to get the medicine 
they need at a price they can afford .... [t]his bill will use competition to make biological drugs - which 
are often prohibitively expensive - available to those who suffer from diseases like cancer, diabetes and 
AIDS.”88 
*161 If the bill is successful, generic versions of biological commercial products will pass through the 
FDA approval process more quickly--thus allowing the consumer to purchase biologics at a price bred 
from market competition. 
 
A. Biologic Generics and § 271(e)(1) 
The advent of biologic generics is not something new. Since December of 2005, the European Medicines 
Agency (“EMEA”) has been establishing guidelines by which a biologic generic may win approval in 
the European system.89 Though the European system is new, it is possible to now move ahead as a 
                                                             
87 To amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the licensing of comparable and interchangeable 
biological products, and for other purposes of 2007, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposed act) (previously the 
Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act of 2006, H.R. 6257, 109th Cong. (2006)). The problem arises from the fact that 
even small changes within the protein structure of a “biosimilar” product can enact fairly tremendous changes 
regarding the operation of the compound within the body. Given that seemingly-negligible changes can produce far 
from negligible results, the FDA has thus far been generally unwilling to view biosimilar compounds as generics of 
a preexisting compound. This distinction lies in stark contrast with what is seen in the pharmaceutical arena, where 
the predictable nature of near-identical chemical compounds has lead to a fluid approval process. 
88 Benesh, supra note 84. This statement is particularly important as it sheds light on what Sen. Waxman intended 
when he initiated the enactment of the 1984 bill that created the safe harbor for generic pharmaceuticals. Id. This 
modern incantation of the legislative history surrounding the creation of § 271(e)(1) shows an unequivocal intent to 
create a regulatory pathway from which generic biologics may be placed on the market (after the patent term has 
expired, of course) so that the burdensome costs of current biologics may be lowered by competition. Id. Waxman’s 
statements do not aim to create a nebulous safe harbor by which one biotechnology company may utilize the 
patented technologies of another as long as there is some sort of drawn-out relation to the common law research 
defense doctrine. Instead, the language specifies a desire to allow generics to enter the market as soon as possible. 
Senator Clinton, fellow advocate for the current bill, declared in a statement that “[t]his bill comes in response to 
years of recognition of the need for a new statutory pathway for approval of generic versions of biotech drugs. These 
products are not subject to the 1984 law that first authorized FDA to approve generic drugs.” Press Release from 
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Waxman, Schumer, Clinton Introduce “Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act” 
(Sept. 29, 2006), http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/details.cfm?id=264152. Not only does this statement 
make direct reference to the 1984 provision, but it expressly declares that § 271(e)(1) does not apply to biologics. In 
light of the Supreme Court’s recent findings in Merck II, this statement seems to be somewhat inconsistent with the 
Court’s view on the matter. 
89 Sarah Houlton, Global Report: Moving Towards Generic Biologics: EMEA opens the door a crack. Generic 
biologics push for minimal testing, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE MAG., Feb. 1, 2006, available at http:// 
www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=301751. 
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producer of biologic generics in the European arena.90 This regulatory framework, as crafted by the 
EMEA, gives Europe a huge advantage in the biosimilar products industry. 91  Several important 
biologics have already seen generic analogues win approval under the European system, and the 
developmental capital required for the production of such generics has been forthcoming. This change, 
when finally enacted by the United States, will undoubtedly alter the commercial scenery faced by the 
American Biotechnology Corporation. 
 
When the change does occur, monopolies that once existed on patent-expired biologics will cease to 
exist, as the market incentive to enter competition with a grossly overpriced biologic will be high. From 
the standpoint of the American consumer, this is an advantageous *162 result. Correspondingly, it spells 
difficultly ahead for the biotechnology sector. The industry will undoubtedly change to adjust for the 
new economic conditions, and though it will easily survive the shift, the reality is that the biotech 
industry will not be quite as profitable for developers as it once was.92 
 
Senator Waxman has recently again stepped forward in the name of securing the rights of generic 
producers against developers after patent term expiration. In doing so now, as he did previously in 1984, 
Senator Waxman is again making express reference to the need for generic substitutes to be on the 
market. As made clear in his statement regarding this issue, his concern lies with securing a quick and 
predictable mechanism for winning FDA approval of generic biologics. This concern, and the overriding 
topic of generics generally, does not necessitate the creation of a broad-range safe harbor by which any 
use of a patented item, no matter how attenuated to the FDA approval process (if even at all, see AbTox), 
                                                             
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 This is not a bad result, and patent law dictates that the advent of generic biologics is completely permissible 
upon the expiration of the patent term. Instead, the point is to show that the industry isn’t as financially stable as the 
general perception seems to have it. Generally speaking, when a court is confronted with a question of interpretation, 
it is sufficient to rely upon the wording of the statute for clarification. In this instance, however, the industry behind 
the statute is a highly specialized and delicate one, and thus requires a higher degree of economic cognizance than 
what the current court would give it. It seems insufficient to rely on a short series of relatively imprecise words to 
craft the bounds of a safe harbor that implicates a finely-balanced high-tech industry when other more reliable 
considerations are available (such as the foundational principles of patent law or the legislative history behind the 
enactment of § 271(e)(1) or the recent statements from Senator Waxman, etc.). In other words, there seems to be a 
disconnect between the current jurisprudence as it relates to the biotechnology sector and the underlying realities of 
the industry itself. 
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may be legally justified as somehow relating to research and development.93 The legislative mandate for 
such a provision simply does not exist: it cannot be found in the legislative history behind the creation of 
§ 271(e)(1); it cannot be justified by the need to enforce the safe harbor provision as it applies to the 
production of pharma-generics; it is not present in the current (and overridingly similar) language now 
coming again from Senator Waxman; it is not even mandated by the hypothetical *163 needs of an 
apparent-generic biologics producer should the bill pass.94 Simply stated, the mandate for the expansion 
of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor to uses not related to the production of generic pharmaceuticals upon 
patent expiration cannot, in any tangible form outside of the hazy language of the statute itself, be found 
in any meaningful capacity. 
 
VI. Competing Ideologies in Statutory Interpretation of § 271(e)(1): The Arguments Revisited 
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in the Merck II decision, relies on established 
principles of statutory interpretation.95 Though helpful, these canons of statutory interpretation are to be 
used as suggestive guideposts, and the Supreme Court itself has declared that they are not mandatory.96 
Regardless, the Court, in its Eli Lilly decision, decided that the phrase “patented invention” found in the 
language of § 271(e)(1) more appropriately applied to all inventions generally, and was not limited to 
drug-related inventions alone.97 The opinion did not include a discussion of either policy or legislative 
intent. Instead, the Court relied wholly on the absence of a modifier in a short statutory provision to 
                                                             
93 AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp. 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
94 The potential counter argument that, “if they had really intended that result, they would have made the statute 
more clear” fails to acknowledge the pitfalls inherent to statutory interpretation. Only very rarely does the legislature 
succeed at crafting a statute that, on its face, is capable of only one reasonable interpretation. § 271(e)(1) simply 
cannot be seen as one of those statutes. It is insufficient to rely upon the superficial wording of a very short statute to 
take broad judicial strokes aimed at expanding a safe harbor provision beyond that was clearly intended by the 
legislature (as evidenced by the House Committee Report). It is not abnormal for the court to rely upon legislative 
intent in discerning the meaning from confusing or unclear statutes--why the court unanimously decided against 
doing so here is unclear, and serves an injustice not only upon the underlying industry, but also patent law generally. 
95 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Merck II), 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
96 See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S 84, 91 (2001) (declaring, inter alia, that the normal rules of 
statutory interpretation are guideposts--not mandatory rules to which a court must adhere. The Court also remarked 
that the legislative intent is also important with regards to fashioning the meaning of a statute). 
97 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990). 
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buttress a decision with far-ranging ramifications.98 
 
15 years later in the Merck II decision, the Court took a further step toward expansion, applying the safe 
harbor provision to “all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related *164 to the ... submission 
of any information under the FDCA.”99 In order to justify this interpretation, the Court, in a short 
opinion, seems to rely on its own clout for substantiation.100 The opinion broadly proclaims that “we 
think it apparent from the statutory text that § 271(e)(1) exemption infringement extends to all uses” and 
that “[t]here is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the exemption.”101 
These arguments, admittedly, are not without their merit. As a collective matter, they rely upon a strict 
judicial tradition that requires a court, when dealing with an unambiguous statute, to interpret it in 
accordance with the predictable meaning of the offered text. Justice Scalia, who states that “the statutory 
text makes clear that it provides a wide berth,” is undoubtedly adhering to such doctrine.102 But the 
reliance on this formalistic doctrine in the present case is misguided, especially when viewed in light of 
the overriding goals of patent law and corresponding legislative history shadowing the formulation of § 
271(e)(1). 
 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Merck I represents the functional counterpoint to the Supreme Court’s 
application of traditional methods of statutory interpretation in the realm of patent law. Judge Rader’s 
chief argument that § 271(e)(1) was intended to pertain only to the production of generic 
pharmaceuticals finds its strongest anchor in the unambiguous language of the House Committee 
Report. This report declares, for reasons presumably related to clarification, that § 271(e)(1) pertains to 
“a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the bio equivalency of a generic 
substitute.”103 This language is more or less unequivocal in its meaning--it says, in terms that cannot be 
                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Merck II, 545 U.S. at 201. 
100 See Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 H.R. REP. NO. 857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2692. 
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confused, that the safe harbor guaranteed by § 271(e)(1) applies to the producers of generic 
pharmaceuticals--and *165 nothing more. Judge Rader’s discussions of patent law and similarly situated 
constituent decisions are all grounded in this statement of legislative intent. The judicial divide is clear. 
On the one hand, there is a unanimous Supreme Court relying upon traditional mechanisms of statutory 
interpretation, and on the other a specialized expert court relying upon the fundamental norms of patent 
law and the unmistakable declaration of legislative intent. 
  
A. A Correct Interpretation? 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court is right. The Supreme Court, by virtue of being the highest court 
in the land, is the controlling law until it reverses itself. Yet the Supreme Court was also right when it 
spent a good deal of the twentieth century handing down antitrust decisions, usually to the chagrin of 
advising economists, that were predicated solely upon traditional judicial canons.104 Only later, after 
much damage, was credence given to controlling market place considerations by the judiciary.105 The 
Court’s history indicates that when presented with dualistic breeds of law (antitrust and patent, 
specifically) it seems apt to over-rely on judicial constructions when the nature of the issue calls for a 
broader point of view.106 Judicially right and functionally right, therefore, are not always mutually 
inclusive concepts. 
 
It is thus clear what the two sides of this coin amount to: on the one hand, there is the unanimous 
Supreme Court choosing to rely upon the straightforward yet simplistic language of the statute itself, and 
on the other, a specialized court relying, inter alia, upon considerations such as legislative intent, patent 
law norms, and, at least presumably, the needs of the scientist. It is *166 foundationally true that without 
                                                             
104 See, e.g., U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)(applying the per se rule to invalidate a 
pro-competitive practice). 
105  See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-56 (1977) (holding that geographic 
restrictions are not per se illegal, relying upon economics literature to formulate the economic efficiency rationale); 
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (holding that vertical maximum price fixing is not per se illegal, 
relying upon economic writings in reconsidering their precedents). 
106 Dualistic in the sense that antitrust and patent law both represent a combination of skill sets: for antitrust, the 
blending of economics and the law; for patent law, the blending of biology, chemistry, engineering, computer 
science, etc. with the law. 
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an innovator there cannot be innovation. Dr. Uwe Munster of Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals 
believes that “[a] patent means that an idea or any matter that results from a certain idea is the property of 
the person who had the idea.”107 This is a notion that is firmly anchored in the scientific community. 
Without such protection, the incentive to disclose inventions to the public at large decreases. Such 
inventions do not come easily, and generally speaking, a significant upfront financial investment is 
required. There must exist in the minds of the scientific community at large a notion that their ideas will 
be protected by the patent laws that presume to protect them. 
 
Recent judicial expansion of § 271(e)(1) by the Supreme Court does little to reassure them. It is now 
plausible that ideas are being suppressed out of fear that they may be taken without traditional 
compensation under the expanded scope of the new safe harbor. Certainly, in an industry as fundamental 
to basic human wants as that of the biotechnology sector, the consumers’ interests are inexorably tied to 
those of the scientist. Without the continued innovation of potentially life-saving biological technology, 
the consumer loses out no matter what form the corresponding legal paradigm might take. With such a 
vital and complex sector as the backdrop to the Merck II litigation, it is difficult to believe that the 
Supreme Court’s text-based formulation of § 271(e)(1) rises to challenges inherent to the industry. 
 
B. The Future of the Safe Harbor 
*167 With the aforementioned issues already decided, the focus now lies on the issue of research tools. 
In light of the Court’s decisions thus far, it seems appropriate to assume that the Court will once again 
rely upon the vague language of § 271(e)(1) to apply the safe harbor provision of the statute to the 
research tools developed by biotechnology companies. For the many reasons that have been espoused, 
                                                             
107 Interview with Dr. Uwe Munster, Laboratory Head of Analytical Development, Bayer-Schering Pharma, in 
Wuppertal, Germany. Dr. Munster went on further to say that, “Given that inventions are usually achieved by the 
scientist’s drive to improve the quality of life for mankind in sectors such as those of healthcare, energy, 
transportation, material science, and the like, it is of high importance that an invention receives patent protection. In 
order to let society fully participate in the advantages of an invention, large sums of investment capital need to be 
first obtained before that invention can potentially be made available to billions of people (as there are costs relating 
to production facilities, marketing, infrastructure, stores, etc.). Of course, no company would produce these 
inventions if there were no assurances that the money invested would one day return by sales of the product.” 
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this simply cannot be the result. The Supreme Court must adhere to some semblance of patent law norms 
and draw the line in the sand somewhere. Without a clearly defined boundary, the ambiguity and concern 
will only mount. The ultimate effect will be the suppression of technologies until legal conditions 
become more favorable. It is true that biotechnology firms could adjust--technology could be 
incorporated into a machine thus gaining additional patent protection, or contracts could be formed 
specifying the release of a technology to a customer predicated upon a secrecy order--such routes would 
ensure the survival of the industry. 
 
But are such changes advantageous? As discussed previously, the biotechnology sector is as robust now, 
economically, as it ever has been. Investors and venture capitalists alike favor the industry during 
periods of economic downturn due to the relative fiscal buoyancy of the technology component. As the 
venture capitalists go, the innovators and, correspondingly, the consumers go. Without concrete 
patentability, both investors and the venture capitalists alike head towards markets with more favorable 
and predictable controlling variables. If they leave, the supply of capital dries, and the rate of innovation 
correspondingly slows. 
 
It is not unreasonable to impute decent intentions to the Supreme Court with their formulation of § 
271(e)(1). It at once appears logical that an immediate reduction in the development costs for big 
pharmaceutical companies permanently equates to cheaper drugs for consumers. But the issue is not so 
simple. Judge Rader, writing for an expert court and relying *168 upon the language of a well-informed 
legislature, highlights some of the more important complexities, and they are hard to ignore. As the safe 
harbor grows larger, investors naturally become more skittish, scientists lock down their current 
innovations, and the industry circles its wagons until conditions become more favorable. This is a result 
that is clearly not inline with the Court’s controlling intent. 
 
Conclusion 
The solution to the current problem could take several forms. The legislature could intervene and 
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redefine the ambiguous terms of § 271(e)(1), thus sparing the Supreme Court the difficulty of defining 
rules for an esoteric brand of law with complex financial underpinnings. Conversely, more attention 
could be paid to the expertise of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Whatever the remedy, it is 
imperative that the scope of the safe harbor is not extended to include research tools. Such a move would 
represent a dangerous and somewhat unprecedented action against the traditional sanctity of the 
American patent. Given both the unpredictability of the resulting fallout, whatever shape or form it 
might take, and the inherent importance of the industry to the American consumer, the decision that 
inevitably touches on the issue of research tools must be one, with all relevant considerations in mind, 
that shows the appropriate measure of judicial restraint. 
